BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) by Chambers, Jr., Henry L.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2008
BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
University of Richmond, hchamber@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Election Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation






Sup me Co 
States 
David S. Tanenhaus 
EDITOR IN CHIEF 
MACMILLAN REFERENCE USA 
A part of Gale, Cengage Learning 
~ G LE 
CENGAGE Learning· 
Detroit• New York• San Francisco• New Haven, Conn •Waterville, Maine • London 
B 
BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) marked the U.S. 
Supreme Court's entry into the "political thicket" of 
apportionment and electoral politics that Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, in his opinion in Colegroe v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549 (1946), warned the Court that it should avoid. 
The plaintiffi in Baker filed suit alleging the violation 
of their voting rights pursuant to the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The alleged 
violation stemmed from Tennessee's continued use of a 
1901 apportionment statute that, because of population 
shifts in Tennessee from 1901 to 1961, rendered state 
legislative districts malapportioned. The result of the 
malapportionment was the dilution the plaintiffs' votes in 
state legislative elections. 
In response to a ruling by a three-judge panel from 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee that the district court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffi had fuiled to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted, the 
Supreme Court held that the district court did have 
jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge 
the Tennessee statute, and that the case was justiciable. 
The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction because 
the action nonfrivolously sought the vindication of 
substantial rights under the Constitution. The plaint:iffs 
,. had standing because their claim focused directly on the 
dilution of their vote rather than on a more general claim 
:·th_~t the Tennessee government had unconstitutionally 
ed to redistrict. The case presented a justiciable issue, 
Lther than a nonjusticiable political question, because even 
.ough the case related to the political issue of 
:apportionment, it stated a standard equal protection 
claim subject to reasonable adjudication. After suggesting 
that political questions tend to relate to federal separation-
of-powers issues rather than federalism issues, the Court 
stated a new standard for nonjusticiable political ques-
tions, limiting them to questions involving at least one of 
several conditions relating to the commitment of the issue 
to other political branches, the need for courts to make 
political decisions outside of their expertise or authority, 
and the lack of clear judicial standards for resolving the 
dispute .. The Court explicitly declined to suggest an 
appropriate remedy for whatever violation might be 
proved at trial. Justices William 0. Douglas, Tom Clark 
(1899-1977), and Potter Stewart also concurred 
separately. 
Justices Frankfurter and John Harlan dissented. They 
distinguished voting-rights claims based on population 
imbalances, which they deemed nonjusticiable political 
questions, from voting-rights claims based on racial 
discrimination (and other characteristics), which had been 
deemed justiciable and remediable in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The dissenters were 
concerned that the Supreme Court improperly inserted 
the federal judiciary into a political situation that afforded 
no standards for proper adjudication. They argued that 
given that the majority suggested that votes did not have 
to be weighted equally and that equipopulous districts 
were not constitutionally required, it was unclear how a 
court could find an equal protection violation based on 
vote dilution without impermissibly making political 
judgments. 
Though the explicit holding of Baker v. Carr was 
narrow, the case ushered in a new era of direct judicial 
oversight over legislative apportionment. The Baker Court 
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did not hold that votes had to have equal value or that state 
legislative districts had to have equal populations. 
However, once the Court made clear that malapportion-
ment could form the basis of a voting-rights claim, the one-
person, one-vote requirement was arguably sure to follow. 
Indeed, in the wake of Baker, the Court decided Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. I (1964), and Reyno!.ds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), 
all of which enshrined the one-person, one-vote principle 
in equal protection law and triggered the reapportionment 
battles that have raged since the 1960s. 
SEE ALSO Case or Controversy; Political Question 
Doctrine; Reyno!.ds v. Simr, 377 US. 533 (1964); 
Warren Court 
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BALLARD V. UNITED STATES, 329 
U.S. 187 (1946) 
Throughout the early years of the twentieth century, 
many of the constitutional guarantees of equal participa-
tion in society that U.S. citizens now take for granted were 
just beginning to talce shape. For women, however, the 
realization of many of these rights would talce decades. 
This lag in achieving equality resulted in part from the 
vestiges of historical discriminatory policies established by 
the nation's male founders, leaders, and law writers. Much 
of the discriminatory bias derived from the conceptual 
relic known today as romantic paternalism, the notion that 
"the weaker sex" needed protection from life's many 
vicissitudes. As a result, women had been barred from 
making contracts, owning property, voting, and partici-
pating in many other basic and integral social functions, 
including jury service. Allowing them to engage in such 
activities, the logic went, would take them away from 
essential duties and obligations in the home. 
It was not until 1946, in Ballard v. United States, 329 
U.S. 187, that the right of jury service was guaranteed to 
American women, long after it had been granted to other 
groups, including former male slaves. As far back as 1880, 
the Court ruled in Strauder v. West Virginia, I 00 U.S. 303 
that a state law preventing African-American men from 
serving on juries violated the recently enacted Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
The factual scenario leading to Ballard was benign 
enough-the indictment and conviction of individuals 
who conspired to use the federal mail system for fraud. 
Specifically, it involved the distribution of materials 
promoting an allegedly fraudulent religious movement. 
The case had already been to the Supreme Court two 
years earlier. But it took a second go-round for the Court 
to consider the alleged illegitimacy of the indictment and 
conviction of the defendants resulting from the "inten-
tional and systematic exclusion of women from the jury 
panels." 
There was no dispute on the factual question. 
Women had been barred from inclusion on both the 
grand jury, which indicted the defendants, and the petit 
jury, which tried the case and convicted them. The 
question for the Supreme Court in Ballard was whether 
that barring of women from jury service violated the 
principle that juries are intended to reflect "a cross section 
of the community," as the Court had noted four years 
earlier in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
Such an infringement would not merely insult the women 
denied the opportunity to serve, it would skew the jury 
makeup enough to undermine the indictment and verdict. 
By the time it heard oral arguments in Ballard, the 
Supreme Court had decided a number of cases involving 
the jury issue as it related to other groups in society. 
Earlier that term, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S. 
217 (1946), the Court held unconstitutional the exclusion 
of individuals from a jury for income-based reasons. In 
that case, the justices explained that while the American 
tradition of trial by impartial jury does not require 
representatives from every economic, social, religious, 
racial, political, and geographical group, "it does mean 
that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials 
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of 
these groups .... To disregard [this principle] is to open 
the door to class distinctions and discriminations which 
are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury." 
Justice William 0. Douglas refined this further in 
writing for the Court in Ballard: "The systematic and 
intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a 
racial group . . . or an economic or social class, deprives 
the jury system of the broad base it was designed by 
Congress to have in our democratic society." Indeed, he 
continued, "the injury is not limited to the defendant-
there is injury to the jury system, the law as an institution, 
to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal 
reflected in the processes of our courts." The Court 
reasoned further that differences between men and 
women made it especially important to prohibit system-
atic exclusion of women from a jury, noting that neither 
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